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Schwartz: The Demise of Vertical Privity: Economic Loss and the Uniform Com

THE DEMISE OF VERTICAL PRIVITY:1 ECONOMIC
LOSS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The citadel of privity has undergone a massive assault in the
field of products liability yet still remains a viable force in warranty law. In most cases, the privity requirement is held to be a
function of the dangerousness of the product, the type of harm
caused and the situs of the chose in action. As a prerequisite to
recovery under a contract theory for breach of warranty, courts
have required a finding of privity2-- a direct nexus between vendor and vendee. While the strict application of the doctrine created harsh results, courts made inroads to mitigate its effects and
to satisfy judicial notions of justice where conduct was inexcusable and harm intolerable. The results in some instances were
unpredictable and inconsistent until they were finally codified
judicially into a category of exceptions that either supplied privity directly or obviated the need for its application, although in
many instances the route taken was obfuscated.' This article will
explore the devices employed to evade the privity requirements
and will discuss the necessity of extending judicial reasoning to
its logical extreme-the elimination of the vertical privity barrier,
regardless of the qualitative aspect of the harm caused.
The principle of stare decisis underlies the general reluctance
of courts both to undermine previous judicial pronouncements
and to implement, through their own power, rules of law consistent with modern views of social and economic justice. The task
of legal reform is often left to the responsible judgment of the
legislature whose function it is to create and modify law to meet
the pressing demands of the times. While there is no doubt that
courts share this power as well, history has revealed that courts
are hesitant to usurp what they believe to be primarily a legislative function unless the need is imperative. This reluctance could
well explain the viability of the nineteenth century rule of privity
of contract. One might, however, note a strange inconsistency in
that American courts have repeatedly refused to accept and fol1. Vertical privity concerns itself with "who, besides the immediate seller, is liable

to the consumer for injuries caused by the defective product." See Kassab v. Central Soya,
432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848, 855 (1968).
2. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963). Chysky
v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 577-578 (1923); Hunter-Wilson
Distillling Co. v. Foust Distilling Co. 181 F.2d 543, 544 (3d Cir. 1950).
3. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in DefectiveProduct Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 991-92 (1966).
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low many common law doctrines that went unquestioned in England. American courts have attempted to explain away this inconsistency by stating that the common law doctrines did not suit
our domestic conditions; that is, place makes a difference. What
may work well under one set of conditions may be unsuitable
under different conditions.4 Although privity, a simple rule easy
of application probably worked well in days when consumers received their products directly by order, it appears in American
jurisprudence as a vestige of a long since changed economic system. Nevertheless, it may be said that the privity requirement
has flourished more than necessary during the twentieth century
in the area of products liability. Many a plaintiff struck with an
overwhelming harm has been nonsuited, forcing him to take action against insolvent defendants while insulating financially responsible manufacturers and distributors who not only could bear
the loss, but who are in a better position to realize and allocate
the risks flowing from their activities.5
The assault upon the citadel of privity in the twentieth century has been waged primarily on a rule-plus or dialectical basis.'
Some commentators feel that this approach has produced a tolerably satisfactory synthesis,7 although, idealistically, it remains
difficult to accept the notion that justice must await the machinations of time. An astute commentator observes that the courts
can always and often do ". . . 'save the rule' by 'construing' the
facts into a pattern that bears no relation to reality; and the facts
brought out in dissenting opinions leave no doubt that this is
often deliberately done in the interest of the court's view of justice
in the particular case." ' When implementing a rule of law, a court
can narrow or broaden its meaning and application to effect its
underlying purpose. The question thus arises as to why courts
4. Feezer, Manufacturer'sLiability for Injuries Caused By His Products: Defective

Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REv., 1, 27 (1938) [hereinafter cited as "Feezer"].
5. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500-502, 543-544 (1961).
6. Gillam, JudicialLegislation, Legal Fictions,And ProductsLiability: The Agency
Theory, 37 ORE. L. REv. 217, 222 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Legal Fictions].
7. Id. The author does, however, note at p. 222 that such an approach does create
superficial confusion compounded by presumably fixed rules, multitudinous exceptions,
and a shifting line of decisions as the exceptions grow in response to changing needs. "In
fact, the exceptions may become the rule, but ordinarily this is not formally acknowledged
by reformation of the original rule until the process reaches full maturity and the obsolescence of the rule is obvious to all."
8. Feezer, supra note 4, at 24-25 (quoting from LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF SALES p. X [1930]).
9. Id. at 25.
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have resorted either to constructing exceptions to the privity requirement or making unreasonable findings of fact in order to
circumvent the privity requirement. While one underlying purpose, the imposition of liability upon a financially responsible
defendant might seem manifest, further analysis must be undertaken to isolate other factors, such as culpability, upon which
society may justify such liability. Therefore, a study of the relevant case law should prove useful.
I.

DANGEROUS PRODUCTS

A cursory review of the application of the privity doctrine
reveals that inroads were first made in the area of dangerous
products intended for human consumption. Direct suits were allowed by the consumer against the manufacturer "where the
thing causing the injury [was] of a noxious or dangerous kind."10
Speaking of exceptions to the privity requirement, the court in
Mazetti v. Armour" noted that included in this class of exceptions were manufacturers of patent and proprietary medicines.
Direct action would be allowed because manufacturers of these
products are generally shrouded in mystery and the products may
contain poisons which are injurious.' 2 The general public, thus,
has ". . . a right to rely upon the implied obligation of the manufacturer that he will not use ingredients which if taken in prescribed doses will bring harmful results."' 3 The court then noted
that another, comparatively recent exception, applies to the modern method of preparing food for use by the consumer, and to the
more general and ever increasing use of prepared food products.14
The court concluded:' 5
Our holding is that, in the absence of an express warranty of
quality, a manufacturer of food products under modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original
packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may
be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of
trade.
In Tomlinson v. Armour & Co.'" a New Jersey court stated:' 7
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.622,
Id. at
,135 P. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
,135 P. at 636.
75 N.J.L. 748, 70 A. 314 (1908).
Id. at
,70 A. at 317.

,135

P. 633, 634 (1913).
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When the manufacturer puts the goods upon the market in this
form for sale and consumption, he, in effect represents to each
purchaser that the contents of the can are suited to the purpose
for which it is sold, the same as if an express representation to
that effect were imprinted upon a label.
Concerning the sale of food, a Missouri court reached this
conclusion:18
If privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and
circumstance of modern merchandise in such matters, privity of
contract exists in the consciousness and understanding of all
right-thinking persons.
In his dissent, Judge Bland pointed out the fallacy of the
court's reasoning. Since the court had never allowed recovery for
injuries or death caused by a latent defect in a machine, which
can be as dangerous to humans as glass in a soda bottle, it would
appear that the court had taken a position inconsistent with wellsettled rules of law."5 Thus, many courts perplexed by the same
problem extended the categories of exception to dangerous products other than for human consumption and to dangerous instrumentalities.2 0
It is probably true, as Judge Bland noted, that the exception
to the privity requirement in poisonous and deleterious food cases
is based on the thought of dreadfulness and shock of one eating
poisonous or harmful foods.2" The practical effect is to make the
manufacturer an insurer of the product he furnishes to the dealer
who sells it to the public in the original package for immediate
consumption. It should be understood that the liability imposed
by the courts in such cases is based on a warranty-contract action
to which the manufacturer is not a party. The court thus presents
18. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,

S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936).

,

90

19. Id.
20. See, e.g., the following cases: home permanent wave set, Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); soap detergent, Worley v. Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); inflammable cowboy suit,
Blessington v. McCory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953); exploding
bottle, Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281
(1951); defective grinding wheel, DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102
N.E.2d 289 (1951); defective wire rope, Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir.
1946); defective cinder blocks, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc.,
353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); automobile, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
21. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
, 90
S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936).
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the anomaly of allowing a chose in action against one not privy
to the contract by using the artifice of a limited exception doctrine whose boundaries seem arbitrarily drawn. Nevertheless,
judicial inroads on the privity requirement are the result of this
persistent whittling away of the original rule by expanding exceptions based on fictions concerning the dangerous character of the
goods. Referring to these court-made exceptions produced
through the use of fictions, one commentator suggests:"
[Legal fictions] make it possible to change a rule while seeming
to reaffirm it, to move in the direction of progress without alienating conservative interests, and to produce a workable and acceptable solution of a given conflict without tempting either side
to rebellion and without completely destroying the apparent if
superficial consistency of "The Law," which everyone needs to
think of as being, in some degree at least, eternal, immutable,
omniscient, and paternal.
Turning to the rationale of the court in the dangerous product
cases, one may accurately conclude that the imposition of liability is a function of:
(1) the existence of a warranty
(2) the dangerousness of the product
(3) the intent of the manufacturer-that is, whether in
his marketing process he intends his product to reach the
consumer in the same condition in which it leaves the
factory and sells his product to a middle-man with full
knowledge of its future status.
A court holding that such a product falls within an exception
recognized in its jurisdiction will, as a result, feel no qualms in
imposing liability on the manufacturer by cirvumventing the
privity requirement.

II.

THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY

Another device used by courts to enable a direct suit against
the manufacturer is the doctrine of third party beneficiary. Using
this method obviates the requirement of privity. The third party
sues on a contract which the law will aver that, based upon the
circumstances involved, was made for his benefit. The courts,
however, have been indefinite as to their tests for ascertaining
what beneficiaries fall within the theory's protection.? "It is com22. Legal Fictions, supra note 6 at 220-21.
23. 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §356A (2d ed. 1936).
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monly said that such a beneficiary must be a third person whom
the contracting parties 'intend' shall receive a 'direct benefit'
from the promise." 4 As a result, the third party may sue on the
contract, for it is just and practical to permit the person for whose
benefit the contract is made to enforce it against one whose duty
it is to pay."
Thus, in isolated cases, courts have concluded that the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer was made for the
benefit of the consumer, who is the third party beneficiary of the
contract. In Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,0 a consumer was injured by a foreign substance embedded in a piece of cake. In
rendering its decision the court stated:"
The groceryman, who is in effect merely a distributing medium
for the articles of food furnished by the Baking Company, and
the Baking Company, having full knowledge of that fact, dealt
with each other and entered into a contractual relationship for
the benefit of the public, which is the ultimate consumer. In
other words, this contract between the groceryman and the
Ward Baking Company to all intents and purposes was a contract entered into for the benefit of a third party, to wit, the
ultimate consumer. Whatever implied warranty arises in favor
of the groceryman, who established the contractual relationship
with the Baking Company, is for the benefit of this third party,
namely, the ultimate consumer.
The result reached by the above court was to impose liability
on the manufacturer. This result is, of course, the product of a
fiction. While the consumer may benefit incidentally from the
product, the primary benefit accrues to the manufacturer in selling his product to the retailer and to the retailer in selling his
product to the consumer. Accordingly, their intent was to benefit
themselves and confer no right or benefit in a third person. While
the means employed is thus questionable, the result achieved is
satisfying in that it permits a direct suit against the manufacturer.
III. ASSIGNMENTS
"It is a general rule that one who has a right in contract or
quasi-contract may assign that right in effect at common law by
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 237, 120 N.E. 639, 640 (1918).
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
Id. at
, 161 N.E. at 559.
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giving the assignee the power to enforce the right in the name and
stead of the assignor, and generally by statute in his own name."28
Assignments, like other agreements, may sometimes be implied
without express words from the transaction.2 9
Various courts have used this contract principle to subject a
manufacturer to direct suit by a consumer, the theory being that
any existing warranty (implied or expressed) is impliedly assigned to the vendee and to subpurchasers. The assignment principles does not depend on a finding of privity, for under wellsettled contract law, no privity is necessary in the area of assignable contracts. The use of this device is, in fact, a fiction since
the prevailing rule in almost every jurisdiction concerning chattel
is that the mere resale of a warranted article does not give the
subpurchaser a right to sue the original seller for damages caused
by defects either in title or the quality of the goods.30 Although
Professor Williston points out that there seems no reason why a
warranty should be an exception to the rules governing assignments, 31 the fact remains that only under civil law jurisdictions
can it be said that a warranty in chattel can be assigned, in effect
having the warranty run with the goods.32
In the notorious case of Coca-ColaBottling Works v. Lyons"
(more often cited by erudite scholars than by Mississippi courts),
the plaintiff, Lyons, was injured by glass that apparently was
mixed in with her drink. In solving the problem of privity and
thereby allowing direct suit against the manufacturer, the court
stated:"
We have carefully considered the question, and it appears
to be a new proposition in this state, so far as we are able to
discover, and we are of the opinion that the position of appellant
is not maintainable, because as we see it, the bottle of CocaCola which Mrs. Lyons drank was at least a gift to her by her
friend, Mrs. Jackson, and since the gift carried with it the title,
and the implied warranty runs with the title, Mrs. Lyons was
the owner, and rightfully in possession thexeof as one of the
public when she drank the Coca-Cola, and that the manufac28. 1 S. WILLISTON,
29. 2 S. WILLISTON,

SALES

§244 (3d ed. 1948).

CONTRACTS §424 (2d ed. 1936).

30. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES §244 (3d ed. 1948). But see Bordwall v. Collie, 45 N.Y. 494
(1871), where assignment involved warranty of title.
31. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 244 (3d ed. 1948).
32. Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Study, 14 TULANE L. REv. 529
(1940).
33. 145 Miss. 976, 111 So. 305 (1927).
34. Id. at
, 111 So. at 307.
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turer impliedly warranted the purity of the drink to such of the
public as became the rightful possessor and owner of the CocaCola. Therefore, if the drink was injurious by reason of having
glass in it, the bottling company was liable to the consumer.
Another case focusing upon the assignment of a warranty,
Hunter-Wilson Distilling Co. v. Foust Distilling Co.,3" involved a
warranty of excess outage, the owner of a whisky supply having
contracted for storage in the defendant's warehouse. The whisky
and all rights were sold to the plaintiff who then sued the warehouseman on the warranty of excess outage. In rendering its decision in favor of the plaintiff, the court reasoned that since enforcement of the warranty in favor of the appellant did not materially
vary the warehouseman's duty" or materially increase the burden
of risk imposed by the sale of the contract" and that since the
whisky was under the control and custody of the defendant who
knew or should have known that the contract was not personal
because the warehouse receipt contained language showing it was
salable,3" then on that basis liability should be imposed on the
assignment theory.
While in both cases the courts' reasoning is persuasive and
may provide socially desirable results, such reasoning undermines accepted principles of law. As a result those cases are rarely
cited for the propositions set forth and other cases with analogistic circumstances have not extended the scope of the rationale
employed. The determining factors leading to the imposition of
liability and obviating the need for privity include:
(1) The existence of a warranty, express or implied.
(2) The product's being under the control of the manufacturer (or warehouseman).
(3) Knowledge that the product would be resold.
(4) Intent by the manufacturer that his product reach
the consuming public.

IV. AGENCY
Another route by which courts have satisfied the requirement
of privity is to find an agency or quasi-agency relationship be35.
36.
37.
38.

181 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950).
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss2/16

8

Schwartz: The Demise of Vertical Privity: Economic Loss and the Uniform Com

Demise of Vertical Privity

tween manufacturer and retailer or between retailer and consumer. The result is identical in either case, the law of agency
operating to view the agent as extending or accepting the warranty for his principal (either manufacturer or consumer as the
case may be). It should be understood that in using the agency
concept the privity requirement is not circumvented but actually
satisfied, the agent supplying the required nexus to the contracting parties. While the theory is sound, the determination by the
courts based upon the application of the facts to the law has often
been stretched in that where no legal agency exists, one is made
to appear. As is true of the other devices employed, the purpose
is to achieve substantial justice while at the same time preserving
the rule of privity for future cases in which its implementation
might prove a practical necessity.
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
the other so to act. ' 39 "To constitufe the relation there must be
an agreement, but not necessarily a contract between the parties;
if the agreement results in the factual relation between them to
which are attached the legal consequences of agency, an agency
exists although the parties did not . . . intend the legal consequences of the relation to follow." 40
The use of the agency doctrine, has found some comfort in
the courts of Washington, which have readily applied the doctrine
in warranty actions to supply the privity necessary to sustain a
chose in action. In Wisdom v. MorrisHardwareCo.,4 the plaintiff
had ordered an insecticide through a produce company under an
agreement whereby credit was extended. Faced with the problem
that a warranty on the sale of personalty does not run with the
property, the court concluded that the produce company simply
acted as the consumer's agent in obtaining the article requested. 2
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §1 (1958).
40. Id., comment b.
The analysis of agency includes concepts of apparent authority and agency by estoppel. Thus, in Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971), the court (vacating a lower
court decision) concluded that the evidence produced a question for the jury whether the
station operator who repaired the brakes of an automobile and sold it to the plaintiff, who
was injured when the brakes failed, had apparent authority to act as agent of the oil
company. The facts of the case disclose that the oil company sold gasoline and automotive
products through the station, owned pieces of equipment and urged in its advertising
reliance on men wearing the oil company's insignia.
4. 151 Wash. 86,
, 274 P. 1050 (1929).
42. Id. at
, 274 P. at 1052.
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In Freeman v. Navarre3 an analogous situation arose. The
plaintiff, Freeman, hired engineers to plan a heating system. The
engineers recommended and planned a central heating system,
specifying prefabricated pipe units designed and manufactured
by the Ric-Wil Company. Navarre Plumbing and Heating Company was awarded the contract and accordingly ordered the
pipes. Later, the pipe units proved defective, causing an inoperative heating system. In allowing recovery against Ric-Wil, the
court concluded that Navarre was in fact an agent of Freeman,
noting that Navarre was subject to Freeman's complete control
in its choice of pipe and did not exercise any independent judgment. Thus any existing warranties were given, in effect, to Free44
man.

In the above cases, the agency analysis was superficial, the
courts having created a fiction for imposing liability. 45 The more
difficult question is presented in analyzing frarchises and dealerships in which the manufacturer or franchisor can exercise almost
unbridled control. "Whenever a dealer is given what is tantamount to an exclusive distributorship, his license to operate can
often be taken away without great difficulty, so that a court holding that such a dealer is independent is really inaccurate."4 Nevertheless, under current law, an exclusive distributor is held to be
an independent contractor." It rather seems that the dealer is the
manufacturer's alter ego.4" This notion may be admitted practically, but not legally. The manufacturer arranges his economic
entities to avoid the legal determination of an agency relationship. From the manufacturer's viewpoint, control without agency
liability is the essence of the arrangement.4"
Equally as interesting would be analyzing the consequences
of a joint venture, which is ".

.

. an agreement between the par-

ties under which they have a community of interest, that is, a
joint interest, in a common business indertaking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits and losses and a right of joint
43. 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
44. Id. at
,289 P.2d at 1019.
45. Id. at
, 289 P.2d at 1024 (Schwellenbach, J., dissenting). See also Legal
Fictions, supra note 6 at 227.
46. Kovarsky, A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary Boycott (continued), 35
ORE. L. REv. 223, 246 (1956).
47. Id.
48. C. GILLIAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AuroMoaILE INDUSTRY, 16 (1960).

49. Id. at 17.
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control."5 While, in most cases, the manufacturer may not share
directly in the net or gross income of his distributor or dealer,
there is no doubt that he does so indirectly. (The situation is
different in most franchise operations where the franchisor receives a percentage of gross sales or profits.) Should the distributor, dealer, or franchisee be given the right to return the product,
this would be equivalent to a sale on consignment. Any sale made
would net both the distributor and manufacturer the profit
sought with both sharing in the sale. If the product were bought
outright by the distributorship, the manufacturer would still retain an interest in moving the goods from the distributor's shelves
through advertising and promotional schemes, enabling the distributor to reorder, and thus giving rise to a mutual benefit on
each sale of the product.5 1 Coincidentally, the exercise of moderate control on the part of the manufacturer would, technically,
create a joint venture. Nevertheless, this has not been a viable
theory although a large percentage of today's marketing and production, involves highly integrated joint ventures; 52 the arrangements are structured to create independent entities.
Thus, from a legal standpoint it seems difficult to create
either a joint venture or an agency relationship because of the
sophistication of the contracting parties. In analyzing, however,
cases involving agency fictions, as in Freemanand Wisdom, the
courts consistently emphasize:
(1) the existence of an implied or express warranty;
(2) that the manufacturer had knowledge that the product would be consumed by one other than the middleman
whose function it was to purchase the product from the
manufacturer.
V.

ADVERTISED PRODUCT LIABILITY

Advertised product liability has been another device for imposing liability without privity on the manufacturer where the
manufacturer disseminates the advertisements. The requirement, however, is that an express warranty and not mere puffing
be conveyed to the public and relied upon by the individual con50. Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 49 Cal. 2d 501, 506-507, 319 P.2d 617,
620 (1957).
51. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, , 164 S.W.2d 828, 833
(1942).
52. Kovarsky, A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary Boycott (continued), 35
ORE. L. REV. 223, 246 (1956).
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sumer. 53 This device is more closely akin to the tortious aspect of

warranty, having originated as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract."54 It thus reflects the deceit.
rather than the contractual aspect of warranty; there exists no
privity between manufacturer and consumer. 5 As a result, by
circumventing the privity requirement, this concept joins the
ever-expanding class of exceptions. The rationale behind the rule
is clearly expressed
in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,"6 where the court
7
declared:1

It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods to create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not
possess, and then, because there is no privity of contract existing
between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result from the absence
of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.

It should be noted that an express warranty in advertising
may take many forms: statements in newspapers," in catalogues,59 in manuals," in tags affixed to the product,"1 in legends
upon containers,12 in circulars,63 in radio commercials,64 and direct negotiation between the subpurchaser and the manufacturer
may be considered as part of the contract of sale. 5 Thus, in Free
v. Sluss," the court held that the guarantee of quality printed
upon each bar of soap established the manufacturer's knowledge
53. Silvermen v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, , 100 A. 2d 715, 719 (1953).
54. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960). See also Note, Torts: Sales: Warranty: Deceit: Liability of a
Manufacturer to a Subvendee, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 445, 450 (1933).
55. Franklin, When Worlds Collide:Liability Theories and Disclaimersin Defective.
Product Cases, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 974, 975 n.8 (1966). But see Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke
Ball Co. 1 Q.B. 256 (1893).
56. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), afl'd 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
57. Id. at -, 12 P.2d at 412.
58. Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955); Turner
v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945).
59. Evans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 Ga. App. 744, 176 S.E. 843 (1934).
60. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
61. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399
(1962).
62. Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
63. Charter Gas Engine Co. v. Kellam, 79 App. Div. 231, 79 N.Y.S. 1019 (3d Dept.
1903).
64. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958).
65. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932).
66. 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948).
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and intention that the goods should move through the usual
channels of trade and was a representation addressed to those
who would deal in the product. While the manufacturer was
under no obligation to make the guarantee, having made it, he
would in effect, be estopped from repudiating it when the condition of complete unsuitability for the market brought the guarantee into play."
Thus, the rationale is simple; as demonstrated by the Baxter
case, the underlying basis for the application of the advertised
products liability doctrine for allowing direct suit against the
manufacturer consists of:
(1) The express representation to the public inducing the
purchase of the product.
(2) Knowledge and intent on the part of the manufacturer that his product be consumed by the public.
What is, however, difficult to rationalize is the distinction
made by courts between express and implied representations
made to the consuming public. While an express warranty might
expand the scope of liability (the manufacturer having represented qualities other than merchantability), the fact that a manufacturer places his product on the market is an implied representation that the product is at least merchantable. Moreover, by
placing its name upon the product, the manufacturer hopes to
induce reliance on the good quality of its product, thereby conditioning the public to correlate quality with name. In product
marketing, many manufacturers believe that finding catchy
names for their product, is essential to successful selling. Therefore, manufacturers often expend huge sums in research analysis
in their quest for a catchy name. To allow a manufacturer to
claim no privity under such circumstances would be inconsistent
with the advertised product liability theory presented above. The
extension of the doctrine, however, while both logical and simple,
is too often frustrated by myopic courts, that may feel no hesitation in avoiding such a logical analysis. But as often appears true
in the field of products liability, logic may come eventually as a
function of time.
VI.

HENNINGSEN v. BLOOMFIELD MOTORS

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."8 was a remarkable
67. Id. at
,197 P.2d at 856.
68. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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case in that the court, arming itself with every theory used to
circumvent the privity requirement, waged a massive assault
upon the privity citadel to impose liabiliy upon the manufacturer
based on a breach of both an implied and express warranty. Rec0gnizing. modern marketing conditions, the court adopted the
underlying rationale of previous exceptions and seemingly formulated a conduit theory of liability." This theory obviates the need
for privity for it recognizes that the manufacturer is dealing in
reality with the consumer using middlemen as conduits in the
marketing process. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered the following factors:
(1) By establishing a system of independent dealers, manufacturers took steps to avoid warranty obligations by avoiding an
agency relationship with the dealer. Through the use of independent dealers, manufacturers were able to transfer their legal burdens to them, thus obtaining for themselves a large measure of
immunity.7"
(2) With the advent of mass marketing, the manufacturer
became remote from the consumer; sales were accomplished
through intermediaries while demand for the product was created
by advertisements through media. It, thus, became obvious that
the consumer was the one being cultivated. 7'
(3) The interest in consumer protection calls for warranties
by the maker that do run with the goods, to reach all who are
likely to be hurt from the use of any commodity that is unfit for
its expected purpose.7"
(4) It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit
the manufacturer to create a demand by representing that the
goods possess qualities which they do not and then deny the
consumer the right to recover damages because privity is lack73
ing.
(5) The manufacturer's interest is not terminated when he
sells his goods to the wholesaler. He must remove them from the
wholesaler's shelves so that a new supply will be ordered. It would
be a weakness in the law to allow the manufacturer to create a
69. The court, however, left unclear whether such liability would be extended in a
case of economic loss.
70. 32 N.J. 358, 373, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960).
71. Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 80-81.
72. Id. at 379-80, 161 A.2d at 81, citing 2 HARPER & JAsES, LAW OF ToRTS, §28.16 at
1571-72 (1956).
73. Id. at 380, 161 A.2d 81, citing Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, , 12
P.2d 409, 412 (1932).
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demand for his product by inducing a belief that they are suitable
for human consumption and then to avoid liability because priv74
ity is lacking.
(6) From the facts of the case, it appears that the warranty
of Chrysler Corp. was extended by the dealer to Henningsen as
Chrysler's agent.75
(7) There is no rational basis for differentiating between a
fly in a beverage bottle and a defective automobile with its great
potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants and others, thus
7
denanding even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity. 1
(8) Under modern conditions the ordinary layman must
rely on the manufacturer, who has control of the product's construction. In such a marketing milieu, the laymen's remedy
should not be based solely on privity of contract. It should also
rest on the demands of social justice. If privity of contract is
required, then under the circumstances of modern marketing conditions, privity of contract should be considered to exist in the
77
consciousness of all right thinking persons.
As a result of the above factors the court decided:"
Accordingly, we hold that under modem marketing conditions,
when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of
trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies
it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency
between the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.
As noted above, the Henningsen decision was based on the
cumulation of theories formulated by other courts. By isolating
the crucial factors underlying these theories, one can readily determine that direct liability may be based upon:
(1) The existence of an expressed or implied warranty;
(2) The manufacturer's knowledge and intent that its
product be sold to the consuming public, although the
manufacturer is not involved directly; and
(3) (Questionably) -the physical nature of the harm
caused.
74. Id. at 380, 161 A.2d at 81, citing Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex.
,164 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1942).
75. Id. at 373-74, 161 A.2d at 78.
76. Id. at 383, 161 A.2d at 83.
77. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83, citing Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
, 90 S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936).
78. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
609,
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VII.

ECONOMIC

Loss 7 1

The Henningsen opinion was important in the assault upon
privity because it collected the theories necessary to undermine
the privity requirement. The case received wide acclaim in various jurisdictions that were interested in obviating this formidable barrier with the aid of a viable precedent. But, because the
court relied upon a multitude of theories for allowing direct suit,
it left open whether privity would be required in cases involving
economic loss, both direct and consequential. As was noted in a
later case that dealt with Henningsen:0
[I]t cannot be said that serious consideration was given to
whether a distinction should be made between personal injury
claims and loss of bargain claims, i.e., where the breach of the
warranty produced total or partial destruction or diminution in
value of the article sold.
Faced with this problem, the court in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.8 announced outright, in concise and unequivocal
terms, its application of the conduit theory of liability to destroy
the barrier of privity. In rendering its opinion, the court noted
that it could find no just cause for allowing recovery where breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability, regardless of the existence of privity, causes physical harm and disallowing recovery
simply because loss of value of the article sold is the only damage
proximately resulting from the breach.2 In perhaps one of the
most noteworthy decisions in the history of products liability, the
court refined the Henningsen rationale and extended it to its
ultimate and necessary end:83
The manufacturer is the father of the transaction. He makes the
article and puts it in the channels of trade for sale to the public.
79. See Note, Economic Loss in ProductsLiability Jurisprudence,66 COLuM. L. REv.
917 (1966). For the purpose of this article, economic loss may be defined in terms of direct
and consequential economic loss, as distinguished by the author. "Direct economc loss
may be said to encompass damage based on insufficient product value; thus, direct eco.
nomic loss may be 'out of pocket'-the difference in value between what is given and
received-or 'loss of bargain'-the difference between the value of what is received and
its value as represented. Direct economic loss also may be measured by costs of replacement and repair. Consquential economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as loss of
profits resulting from inability to make use of the defective product." Id. at 918.
80. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59, 207 A.2d 305, 308 (1965).
81. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
82. Id. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309.
83. Id. at 59-60, 207 A.2d at 309.
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No one questions the justice of a rule which holds him liable for
defects arising out of the design or manufacture, or other causes
while the product is under his control. After completion the
article may pass through a series of hands, such as distributor
and wholesaler, before reaching the dealer at the point of ultimate intended sale. The dealer is simply a way station, a conduit on its trip from manufacturer to consumer. For these reasons in the recent past the courts of many jurisdictions, in an
endeavor to achieve justice for the ultimate consumer, have
imposed an implied warranty of reasonable fitness on the person
responsible for the existence of the article and the origin of the
marketing process. From the standpoint of principle, we perceive no sound reason why the implication of reasonable fitness
should be attached to the transaction and be actionable against
the manufacturer where the defectively-made product has
caused personal injury and not actionable when inadequate
manufacture has put a worthless article in the hands of an innocent purchaser who has paid the required price for it. In such
situations considerations of justice require a court to interest
itself in originating causes and to apply the principle of implied
warranty on that basis, rather than to test its application by
whether personal injury or simply loss of bargain resulted in the
breach of the warranty. True, the rule of implied warranty had
its gestative stirrings because of the greater appeal of the personal injury claim. But once in existence the field of operation
of the remedy should not be fenced in by such a factor.
Consistent with the Santor approach, the court in Lang v.
General Motors,8 4 also adopted the conduit theory for obviating
the privity requirement. In considering modern marketing conditions, the court concluded that when a manufacturer places a new
product into the stream of trade and promotes its sale to the
public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and suitable
for use accompanies the product into the hands of the ultimate
buyer. Absence of privity is immaterial." The court noted it
would be unreasonable to hold that where a buyer purchases an
automobile, no implied warranty of merchantable quality may be
asserted by the consumer against the manufacturer despite the
fact that the new automobile is in such bad condition and so
defective in materials or construction as to render it useless or
unsatisfactory for the ordinary purpose for which such automobile was designed to serve. 6
84. 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).
85. Id. at 809-10.
86. Id. at 810.
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In Media Production Consultants,Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc.,87 the court implemented the conduit theory
of liability, asserting that by placing an automobile on the market
the supplier represents to the public that the vehicle is suitable
for use."8 Moreover, the court stated: "Louisiana has aligned itself
with the consumer-protection rule, by allowing a consumer without privity to recover, whether the suit be strictly in tort or upon
implied warranty. ' 89 The court could not find any reason why the
rule should not apply to the pecuniary loss resulting from the
purchase of a new automobile that proves unfit for use because
of latent defects. 0
The use of the conduit theory of liability concerning the application of implied warranty again found favor in Cova v. Harley
Davidson Motors Co.," where the court sanctioned a direct suit
against the manufacturer for economic loss. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned: "On principle the manufacturer should
be required to stand behind his defectively manufactured product
and held to be accountable to the end user even though the product caused neither accident nor personal injury. The remote seller
should not be insulated from direct liability where he has merely
mulcted the consumer. ' 9 2 The court continued that one who sues
the manufacturer must, consistent with warranty liability, prove
a defect attributable to the manufacturer and the causal connection between the defect and the injury or damage resulting. 3
In Kassab v. Central Soya, 4 the court overruled Miller v.
Preitz95 (a case requiring vertical privity), and allowed for direct
suit against a remote manufacturer. In recognizing the practicalities of the situation, the court reasoned that continued adherence
to the requirements of vertical privity resulted merely in perpetu87. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
88. Id. at
, 262 So. 2d at, 381. The court added, "[tihe Legislature has declared
that the distribution and sale of motor vehicles in Louisiana vitally affect the public
interest. See LSA-R.S. 32:1251."
89. Id. at
,262 So. 2d at 381.
90. Id. at
,262 So. 2d at 381.
91. 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
92. Id. at
,182 N.W.2d at 804.
93. Id. at
,182 N.W.2d at 804. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-715 and
comments on subsection (2).
94. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968). The harm alleged in this case was damage to
cattle-property damage. The court, however, seemed not to restrict its holding specifically to property damage. From its holding one may draw a fair inference that the vertical
privity requirement was abolished in reference to all types of harm-physical, property,
and economic.
95. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss2/16

18

Schwartz:Demise
The Demise of Vertical Privity: Economic Loss and767
the Uniform Com

of Vertical Privity

ating a needless chain of actions whereby each buyer must seek
redress from his immediate vendor until the manufacturer has
liability thrust upon himself.96 "Vertical privity can no longer
commend itself to this court."9 7
Finally, the momentous decision in Randy Knitwear v.
American Cyanamid Co.9scracked the citadel of privity, the court
declaring:99
In concluding that the old court-made rule should be modified
to dispense with the requirement of privity, we are doing nothing more or less than carrying out an historic and necessary
function of the court to bring the law into harmony "with
modern-day needs and the concepts of justice and fair dealing".
It thus appears that courts are finally recognizing that there
is no longer any justification for vertical privity requirements in
modern society, while continued adherence to the principle creates a gross disservice to the consuming public. When the purpose
for a rule ceases, it is logical that the rule should be interred.""
While many courts today will allow direct suit against the manufacturer where defective products cause physical or property
damages, there lurks an underlying fear to extend it as well in
cases of economic loss. Upon what might this fear be justified?
Some authorities suggest that when privity is lacking and no
danger of physical harm results from the manufacturer's actions,
recovery for most consequential economic loss caused by a defective but not dangerous product cannot be justified on the grounds
of deterrence of dangerous conduct or responsibility for induced
reliance. 1 ' Further, it is also difficult to justify such economic
recovery under a risk spreading theory since the risk to the manu10 2
facturer is less insurable than in the case of a personal injury.
The proponents of this position, therefore, must accept as basic
96. 432 Pa. 217,
,246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968).
97. Id.
98. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
99. Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370. Although the language of the
court may be interpreted broadly, the holding should be restricted to cases of express
warranties made by the manufacturer and relied upon by those not in privity with it.
Thus, the court allowed recovery despite the fact that the damage was only economic in
nature.
100. Corso v. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, 171 Cal. App. 2d 816,
,342 P.2d 56, 61 (1959).
101. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
917, 964-65 (1966).
102. Id. and see examples following in text of Note.
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premises that circumvention of the privity requirement is to deter
the production of dangerous products only, and that there can be
no reliance by a consumer, absent an express representation, that
a product is what it purports to be. Concerning the allocation of
risk, the underlying premise is that the intention of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as evinced by various sections, is to allow
merchants to distribute risk among themselves by using disclaimers and limitations on consequential damages.' 3 Moreover, the
merchant further down the chain of distribution is better able to
realize the risks involved and can more effectively insure against
them."' He is also in a position of comparable bargaining power
with his vendor and they can thus contract to allocate the risks
between themselves to create the desired result while using price
as the tool. 0 5
These arguments seem superficially convincing, but the
basic premises involved are unacceptable. While the purpose of
strict tort liability may be to deter the production of dangerous
products that cause physical harm,"0 8 the purpose of contract law
is to provide the parties with the benefit of their bargain.' 7 The
basis for obviating the privity requirement with respect to defective products stems from the rationale that the manufacturer has
placed a defective article in the hands of an innocent purchaser
who has paid the required price.' 8 Since the manufacturer intends his product to reach the ultimate consumer in the same
103. Id. at 965-66. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §2-316 (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties) and comments, and §2-719 (Contractual Modification or Limitation
of Remedy) and comments thereafter.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §402A:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and

(b) it is espected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2)

the rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and

(b)

the user or consumer has not bought the product from or

entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

107. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 60, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (1965).
108. Id.
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condition, using middlemen as conduits, and since the law will
imply a warranty, it seems only natural that a consumer may
justifiably rely on his belief that the goods are fit for their intended purpose.
Concerning the allocation of risk argument, its proponents
seem inextricably confused. They associate the concept of privity
with limitation of damages and disclaimers. Should the manufacturer desire to allocate the risks thrust upon him, he need merely
disclaim the implied warranty under §2-316 or limit consequential damages under §2-719 of the Code." 9 Obviating the need for
privity would also reverse the process, in effect, having the manufacturer's disclaimer or limitation of damages travel directly to
the ultimate consumer. As a practical matter, however, the requirement of effective notice must still be met."0 The manufacturer could stamp such a notice on the face of the product. This
the manufacturer would seem hesitant to do since to do so would
tend to instill in the public a sense of distrust. The manufacturer
would prefer to hide behind the cloak of privity and limit his
exposure to liability while keeping the public unaware of his disclaimer or limitation on recovery.
Should, however, the manufacturer, choose to disclaim or
limit consquential damages (according to the above procedure),
he would, in effect, be transferring that risk to his vendee"' who
would be free to do the sane with his buyer. In this manner, the
manufacturer and its subpurchaser could allocate the risks as
between themselves with a "disclaimed" or "limitationed" product, realizing a lower price than one in which the liability is
assumed. Moreover, if the limitation were ruled ineffective or unconscionable, the members in the chain of distribution could
agree to indemnify one another 2 using the price as leverage when
109. As noted in subsection 3-"[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
110. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316 and comments therein and §2-719 and
comment on subsection (1)(b) and (3).
Herein lies the greatest problem with the author's analysis. Disclaimers or limitations
on the face of the product may not be able to provide adequate notice to the consumer.
The size of the product, the nature of the product, the possibility of labels being torn, or
being intentionally removed, and sundry other possibilities, including space limitations,
present a practical difficulty in this area. Another problem to be considered is whether a
consumer would understand the wording and the effect of the limitation or disclaimer.
111. In any sale made by the subpurchasing merchant, an implied warranty will arise
by operation of law. UNIFORM COMMiRCIAL CODE §2-314.
112. The possibility of indemnification assumes no violation of public policy.
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bargaining. This procedure, noted above and set forth in the
Code, would seem to undermine the previous argument presented, distinguishing between privity on the one hand and disclaimers and limitations on the other. Privity in this context
would seem the improper factor upon which to focus the analysis
of the manufacturer's ability to exclude or limit damages.
Another possible motive for requiring privity in cases involving economic loss may be found in Seely v. White Motor
Company."3 Chief Justice Traynor denied recovery against a remote manufacturer on the basis of strict liability in tort and
implied warranty, although he permitted recovery on the theory
of express warranty, even though the plaintiff Seely did not rely
upon the express representation."' Nor did the manufacturer's
warranty constitute part of the basis of the bargain."' In denying
recovery under strict liability in tort Judge Traynor might have
applied the same analysis to the theory of implied warranty, holding it, likewise, inapplicable. Note that in denying recovery in
tort, the court stated that the manufacturer would be liable for
damages of unknown and unlimited scope. 1 '6 In differentiating,
then, between economic loss and physical injury, the court concluded that a consumer should not at the manufacturer's will be
chargeable with bearing the risk of physical injury when a consumer buys a product on the market." 7 The cost of the injury, the
loss of time and health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, but not to the manufacturer since the risk of
liability can be insured against and distributed among the public
118
as a cost of doing business.
If the Seely rationale is to serve as the basis for refusing the
application of implied warranty, a deeper analysis is required. As
shown by Judge Peters, both economic loss and personal injury
involve the element of economic loss and both proximately arise
out of the purchase of a defective product.' While personal injury may be slight and may include loss of earnings (realistically
economic loss), a defective product could force suspension of
113. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
114. Id. at ,403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (Peters, J., concurring and dissent.
ing).
115. Id.
116. Id. at
117. Id. at
118. Id.
119. Id. at
and dissenting).

,403

P.2d at 150-151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.

,403

P.2d at 145, 155-156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28 (Peters, J., concurring

,403
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business activity and cause an intolerable loss of earnings; such
a result could have a more widespread effect, than, for example,
a sprained finger. Moreover, those who fear that such a procedure
might expose the remote manufacturer to unlimited liability need
only remember that warranty recovery is limited to the reasonable damages contemplated by the parties1 2 proximately result1
1 22 or limited,M
ing from the breach, ' 21 and may be liquidated
while recovery for physical injury is governed only by the scope
of proximate cause and may not be limited or disclaimed.1 24 This
point, however, realistically is merely academic since the manufacturer is ultimately liable, in any event, through indemnification,' 5 a process involving impleader12 1 or vouching in.12 1 One
must note, however, that this circuity of action is an expensive,
time-consuming, and wasteful process and may be interrupted by
insolvency, lack of jurisdiction, disclaimers, or the statute of limitations.' 28 It would, therefore, serve no purpose of the law to insulate a culpable manufacturer based upon fortuitous circumstances which would prevent the imposition of liability upon him.
While destroying the privity barrier is one solution, some commentators call for a judicial change in the basic indemnity principle so that the plaintiff would be permitted to take his judgment
against the retailer and pursue it directly against anyone from
whom the retailer might recovery indemnity.1 29 Simply destroying
the privity barrier, however, appears simpler and superior. Thus,
while Judge Traynor may not have considered the application of
implied warranty to economic loss where privity is lacking, it
behooves all courts that deny recovery on that basis to understand the underlying rationale that they are adopting.
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-715.
121. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-715, subsection (2)(b).
122. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-718.
123. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719.
124. Id. at subsection (3). A fair inference can be drawn that if recovery for physical
injury may not be limited in any manner, then the implied warranty may not be disclaimed where such injury arises. It would be folly to uphold a disclaimer while voiding a
limitation. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Company, 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau Co. 1969); Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209
N.W.2d 643, 653 (1973).
125. 1 S. WILISTON, SALES §244 (3d ed. 1948).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.

127.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-607 subsections (5) and (6) and comments

thereon.
128. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960).
129. Franklin, When Worlds Collide:Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 1018 (1966).
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CONCLUSION

The trend in warranty law concerning products liability is
manifest. Courts are finally recognizing that the ancient law of
privity has no application in today's complex economic system.
While the older cases reveal a struggling effort on the part of
courts to create an exception or a fiction as the basis for circumventing the formidable barrier of privity, the underlying rationale
is based upon the theory that the manufacturer knew and intended the product to be placed in the stream of commerce and
to reach the ultimate consumer in the same condition as when it
left its hands. Recent decisions reveal no hesitation on the part
of courts to adopt outright the conduit theory of liability, placing
the real costs of the product, on the party creating the defective
product.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not deal with the problem of vertical privity. In regard to vertical privity, the Code
states that it ". . . is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain.""'3 Because the results differ greatly depending on the situs of the chose in action, it would seem that the Code
has failed, in that respect, to make uniform the law with respect
to sales.13' Accordingly, it is left to the various jurisdictions to
formulate a rule of law, hopefully on a rational basis, to achieve
the substantial ends of justice. It thus remains difficult to comprehend the fear both in courts and legislatures which impels
them to plod blindly on, hoping that somehow a resolution of the
problem will occur through some messianic process. The Code
and the various jurisdictions have so far failed to squarely confront and resolve the problem in the spirit of a rational jurisprudence. Defining products in terms of degrees of dangerousness or
segregating damages into personal injury or economic loss does
little to produce a viable theory that satisfies the expectations of
the consuming public in a modern setting. With respect to privity, differentiating between an express warranty and an implied
warranty of merchantability is, perhaps, merely a useful exercise
in the art of semantics. Courts must pursue with alacrity the ends
of social and economic justice to protect a consuming body incap130. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318 comment 3.

131.

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE §1-102, subsection (2)(c). As noted also, the purpose

of the code is to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.
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able of self-protection. Accordingly, the author recommends an
alternative to the existing alternatives currently offered by §2-318
of the Code (as amended 1966):
ALTERNATIVE D
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any subpurchasing merchant and to any consumer who suffers
physical injury, property damage, or economic loss because of
the breach of warranty. A consumer is defined as any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods. A seller is defined as any person or entity in the
manufacturing or distributive chain of sale. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury of the person or property of an individual to whom the
warranty extends. Limitations on economic loss shall be governed by sections 2-719 (contractual modification or limitation
of remedy) and 2-302 (unconscionable contract or clause). Any
limitation on remedy shall be governed by the notice provisions
of section 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties).
The practical effect of adopting the above alternative is significant. It would place all sellers, from manufacturer to retailer,
in privity with the consumer and in privity with each other. The
consumer could then proceed against any party unless that
seller's limitation or disclaimer appeared on the face of the product, conspicuously marked. The seller, in turn, could seek indemnification from any seller above himself in the distributive chain
of sale including the manufacturer who likewise did not disclaim
nor limit liability. This procedure would result in shifting the
burden of liability as close as possible to the party responsible for
creating the risks. Since a "limitationed" or "disclaimed" product would be less desirable, the manufacturer would realize a
lower price, thereby shifting that exposure to his vendee, who
would assume the risk of economic loss only because, under the
Code, personal injury and property damage may not be limited
or disclaimed.'1: 2 The vendee would in turn bargain with his sub132. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719, subsection (3). The Code leaves a gap
in this section by not covering injury to property. The Code states, "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where loss is commercial is not." Property
damages constitute neither injury to the person nor commercial loss. A premise of this
author's analysis, however, is that personal and property damages should be treated alike.
,403 P.2d 145, 152 (1965), in which Chief
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
Judge Traynor notes: "Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there
is no reason for distinguishing them." See also Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel
(Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YAL L.J. 1099, 1143 (1960). See also note 124,
supra.
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purchasers, consistent with the above procedure, to further allocate the risks. The result would be to provide all sellers as proper
defendants for personal and property liability suits, thereby adequately protecting those interests of the consumer by allowing the
direct suit by a consumer against any seller. Thus, in the case of
personal injury or property damage, the manufacturer would be
held ultimately liable while in cases of economic loss the seller
highest up in the distributive chain of sale who neither disclaimed
nor limited consequential damages would be liable with the sellers being allowed to allocate the risks as between themselves
consistent with the intent of the Code. This alternative, in effect,
would fairly protect the necessary interests of the consumer while
allowing merchants to allocate between themselves the cost of
insuring for economic loss, or else limiting consequential damages, whereby they would pass on the savings to the public, such
product having a market price less than a fully warrantied product in which no disclaimer or limitation on recovery appears.
Since any attempt to disclaim or limit liability would have to be
conspicuous, 33 the consumer would have full knowledge and
could intelligently decide for himself how to allocate the risks
involved-whether to buy the more expensive product or to buy
the less expensive one and assume the risk of economic loss. Accordingly, this alternative would achieve the optimum of fairness
by protecting the inviolate interests of consumers while allowing
for the conscious determination of risk distribution on the part of
sellers and consumers alike. Although the advent of industrywide disclaimers and limitations on economic loss might be the
practical result of such a procedure, it must be noted that a
manufacturer maintains an interest in preserving the quality of
its name in a competitive market and in bolstering the demand
for its product. Should the competitive forces fail, however, it
would be the task of the courts to proceed on a case by case basis
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316 and comments: It would seem, concerning
consumers, that a disclaimer of the implied warranty would be similar to a limitation of
consequential damages. Since it would appear that a seller may not disclaim his warranty
in caes of personal injury or property damage, the disclaimer would be equivalent to a
limitation, the only difference being the seller's liability for direct economic
loss-diminution in the value of the product. Although the seller may exclude recovery
for consequential damage, he may not do so in a case of direct economic loss. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719, subsection (2). However the use of a disclaimer would result
in no liability for direct economic loss. Since, however, limitations and disclaimers are so
similar, it would be perfectly consistent to have the notice requirements under §2-316 be

applicable to limitations and exclusions as well. See Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C.
192,

, 182 S.E.2d 389, 394-95 (1971).
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to refine the concept of unconscionability as set forth in §2-302
of the Code, and in that manner further protect the interests of
the consuming public.134 The final result would be to achieve
social and economic justice predicated on a rule of law which is
both fair and rational.
Martin V. Schwartz
134. See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 447-450, 240 A.2d
195, 199-200 (1968).
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